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SUMMARY
We model and analyze the dynamics of religious group membership and size. A groups
is distinguished by its strictness, which determines how much time group members are
expected to spend contributing to the group. Individuals differ in their rate of return for
time spent outside of their religious group. We construct a utility function that individ-
uals attempt to maximize, then find a Nash Equilibrium for religious group participation
with a heterogeneous population. We then model dynamics of group size by including
birth, death, and switching of individuals between groups. Group switching depends on
the strictness preferences of individuals and their probability of encountering members of
other groups. We show that in the case of only two groups one with finite strictness and
the other with zero there is a clear parameter combination that determines whether the
non-zero strictness group can survive over time, which is more difficult at higher strictness
levels. At the same time, we show that a higher than average birthrate can allow even the
highest strictness groups to survive. We also study the dynamics of several groups, gaining
insight into strategic choices of strictness values and displaying the rich behavior of the
model. We then move to the simultaneous-move two-group game where groups can set up
their strictnesses strategically to optimize the goals of the group. Affiliations are assumed
to have three types and each type of group has its own group utility function. Analysis
on the utility functions and Nash equilibria presents different behaviors of various types
of groups. Finally, we numerically simulated the process of new groups entering the reli-
gious marketplace which can be viewed as a sequence of Stackelberg games. Simulation





Religion can be highly dynamic. Unless stifled by government regulations that hinder
competition, religious groups will come and go as they experience inflows and outflows of
membership [1, 2]. As shown in a comprehensive study of American religion, religious
market dynamics are seen in the high rates of religious switching and reaffiliation among
churchgoers [3]. While some groups win in this competition for adherents, others lose,
and the outcome is a vibrant religious marketplace with a diversity of forms of religious
practice.
A body of research during the last few decades has drawn inspiration from economic
models of markets and group production to explain this vibrancy, yet this work provides
only an incomplete understanding of the dynamic processes in religious markets. Two cen-
tral thrusts of research are most relevant. The first identifies the locus of religious activity
in the religious group, with the group serving as a collective-production entity that is sus-
ceptible to free-rider problems. The theory demonstrates that strict religious groups better
confront free-rider problems than their less-strict counterparts, thereby enabling the strict
groups to more successfully provide religious goods and services [4, 5]. This insight helps
to explain why strict churches have grown faster during the last several decades [6]. The
second is that wide diversity of religious preferences can sustain a wide range of religious
groups and practices when religious suppliers are allowed to enter and compete [7, 8, 9].
As in the markets for other goods, there are differences in tastes for different types and
styles of religion, and a diversity of forms of religious practice are needed to satisfy the di-
verse tastes. Entrepreneurs supply this diversity, and high religious pluralism results from
religious consumers with different tastes making their optimal affiliation decisions.
This dissertation constructs and examines a dynamic model of religious competition
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that combines these two theories into a single framework. In so doing we are able to
reconcile what may at first appear to be a contradiction between the two views. While
the latter theory recognizes the viability of all types of religious practice styles, the former
implies that strict religious groups should outperform and possibly drive their less-strict
competitors out of the market. We propose that the theories do work together but that
additional factors are also relevant to a broader understanding of religious competition. In
particular, we suppose that the relative success of different religious groups will depend
not just on strictness but also on several other factors mentioned in the literature but not yet
examined in a formal dynamic framework. Among these other factors are the strength of the
cultural transmission of religious preferences across generations, the likelihood of exposure
to other groups, the underlying distribution of preferences for non-religious goods, and
birth rates.
The incorporation of these features into our model draws inspiration from two other
literatures. One literature establishes the vital role of demographic factors in the growth and
decline of religious groups [10, 11]. The second literature uses dynamic models of cultural
transmission to understand the spread of religious practices within and across generations
[12, 13]. Our model thus combines key elements of several different strains of analysis,
namely, the club model of religious production, spatial models of religious competition,
demographic models of religious growth and decline, and the dynamic models of cultural
transmission.
The mathematical and simulation analysis herein reveals that the dynamics of a reli-
gious market with these many features are rich but that several patterns are still emergent.
One finding is that very strict groups will die out unless they have sufficiently high birth
rates and retention. This finding has been predicted in prior work [14], and our analysis
reveals that it is robust to several additional complexities in the market. A second finding
is that moderate groups can survive if their strictnesses advantageously place them near
the mean of the underlying distribution for non-religious goods. That moderate groups
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can survive and thrive has been noted before in explicit dynamic studies [15, 16], but we
demonstrate how several other factors not mentioned in those studies can also contribute to
the persistent success of moderate groups.
Three prior attempts to explicitly model religious market dynamics are most similar
to ours. Montgomery [15] examined an environment with three strictness levels and the
ability for religious groups to adjust strictness levels as their membership compositions
changed over time. He found that the low-strictness groups do shrink and die out as pre-
dicted under some parametric configurations, but that they also survive and thrive under
others. Makowsky [16] allowed for a wider range of possible strictnesses to show why the
less-strict groups might thrive. Lighter membership requirements allow for larger in-group
heterogeneity in more moderate rates of free-rider mitigation, thus allowing for a degree of
success in the market. Finally, Scheitle et al [11] simulated the growth of a hypothetical
American religious group under different assumptions about in-group fertility and religious
switching. They show that both fertility and switching play key roles, and that switching
plays a particularly important role in the long run. Our model differs from these prior stud-
ies in its formal synthesis of the several factors mentioned earlier, i.e., cultural transmission
across generations, differential rates of interaction among individuals of different groups,
and variation in birth rates. Ultimately, our work demonstrates how these many factors
contribute to the variety of outcomes possible in a religious market.
We also study the competitions of groups in the religious market in this dissertation.
In prior models, religious groups are often assumed to enter the marketplace at different
times so that groups currently in the market must care about potential entrants. Barros and
Garoupa [17] treated churches as Stackelberg leaders followed by sects. McBride [8, 9]
used a two-stage representation of group entry allowing groups to postpone the decision at
stage two instead of entering at stage one. In our work, we first analyze the simultaneous-
move two-group games to gain some understanding of the behavior of different types of
groups at the Nash equilibria. Then we adopt the idea that current groups have to be con-
3
cerned about the future potential followers and simulate how groups sequentially enter the
religious market. This process can be viewed as a sequence of Stackelberg games. Simula-





2.1 Individual Utility Function
Each individual must decide what portion of his or her time will be devoted to in-group
activities, with the remaining portion devoted to out-group activities. Without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that each person has a total time of 1, and the amount that individual i
then devotes to in-group activities is denoted by ti. It is assumed that in-group time is spent
communally by the members of the group in production of “goods” that are distributed
amongst the group members evenly, regardless of their individual contribution.







where c > 0 is a constant, Ng is the total population of the religious group g to which
individual i belongs, and
∑
j is taken over all members of group g, including member i.
As is standard in economic models, the utility function represents how the individual
ranks different possible alternatives that may arise in the course of social interaction. A
technical condition is that, as all tj ≤ 1, the sublinearity of the in-group utility in terms of
the mean in-group time contribution causes the utility to be greater than the mean, reflecting
the efficiency of group work. Of course, raising the mean in-group time contribution to any
positive power less than 1 would do the same; we choose the power to be 1/2 for simplicity.
We also assume that all groups share the same factor c, such that no groups are inherently
better at producing group utility than others. Finally, implicit in (2.1) is the assumption
that Ng > 1, otherwise the “group” would merely be a single individual. If Ng = 1, then
Uin = 0.
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Out-group activities yield a utility that is linear in the time spent outside the group,
1− ti, such that
Uout = ri(1− ti). (2.2)
The factor ri ≥ 0 could reflect something like an hourly wage that can be earned at a
job away from the group, but more generally reflects how much an individual personally
values her time away from the group, during which she can engage in whatever activities
she prefer. We will assume throughout that the values of ri for the various individuals are
drawn from a probability density R(r).
The religious group is subject to potential free-rider problems. The amount that individ-
ual i earns from in-group activities may be dominated by the various tj of the other group
members, while the out-group utility is determined solely by the actions of individual i in
such a way that time spent in-group returns a smaller Uout. Hence, many individuals may
maximize their utility by simply choosing to contribute ti = 0, which will maximize Uout
while in many circumstances leaving Uin relatively unchanged. To combat such behavior,
we allow the group to administer a punishment such that those members contributing less
than what the group deems a minimal acceptable level will have their utilities reduced by
an amount
P = βg(λg − ti)+.
Here, βg ≥ 0 sets the overall scale for punishment within group g, while λg ∈ [0, 1] is
defined to be the the “group strictness”, which is the main trait that will serve to differentiate
groups within our model, and (·)+ denotes the positive part of (·). The larger λg is, the
stricter the group and the more time the group demands of its members. However, a member
is only punished she fails to contribute at least λg to the in-group activity. The punishment
conceptualized here may be reflected in many ways: actual withholding of some of the
group-produced goods from the individual, social pressures that may lead to ostracizing,
or something else. Stricter groups have the means to enforce in-group norms, including
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norms related to in-group contributions.
The overall utility function U of person i in group g is equal to the sum of in-group
production Uin and out-group production Uout minus the punishment P . Without loss of
generality, we will scale all utilities by the common factor c and redefine ri and βg in terms
of this standard scale, such that our final individual utility function is






+ ri(1− ti)− βg(λg − ti)+. (2.3)
2.2 Single Group Nash Equilibrium
We now consider the case of a single group with parameters λg = λ and βg = β and
with a fixed set of members, such that the population size Ng = N and the set of r val-
ues present within the group are unchanging. Then, to be determined for each individual
in the group is what value of ti she should choose. It is assumed that every individual is
attempting to maximize her own personal Ui through this choice, but note that each per-
son’s Ui is also partially determined by the decisions of every other group member through
the Uin term. Then, this is a classical game-theoretic problem, where the standard solu-
tion concept is the Nash Equilibrium. In this case, a Nash Equilibrium would be a set
of in-group times of each member t⃗ = {t1, t2, . . . , ti, . . . , tN} with corresponding mem-
ber utilities U⃗ = {U1, U2, . . . , Ui, . . . , UN} such that there does not exist any alternative
t⃗′ = {t1, t2, . . . , t′i, . . . , tN} in which only member i has changed his choice such that the
corresponding U⃗ ′ = {U ′1, U ′2, . . . , U ′i , . . . , U ′N} would satisfy U ′i > Ui, for any i. In other
words, in a Nash Equilibrium, no individual i can increase her utility by unilaterally chang-
ing to a different ti.
In principle there are five options for ti which could possibly maximize Ui for an indi-
vidual, given that all other tj are fixed: 0, 1, λ, and two potential critical points we might
7








− Ti ≡ biλ, 0 < bi < 1, (2.5)
where Ti =
∑
j ̸=i tj . Note that, due to constraints on the intervals where they may be






















For fixed Ti , Ui(1) = Ui(λ) at an ri value within the range of values in (2.6), with ri
values higher than this causing Ui(1) < Ui(λ). Similarly, U(λ) = U(0) at an ri value in the
interval in (2.7), with ri values higher than this causing Ui(0) > Ui(λ). Also note that for
fixed Ti and ti = 0, 1, or λ, Ui is trivially non-decreasing in ri. For ta, which is a function




+ ri(1 + Ti) , (2.8)
which is also increasing on the region of ri values for which ta is available, and ranges over




+ ri(1 + Ti)− β(λ+ Ti) , (2.9)
which is also increasing in ri for all values for which it is available and ranges between the
values Ui(λ) and Ui(0). Hence, for fixed Ti, the maximal value of Ui is a non-decreasing
function of ri, and the optimal ti smoothly transitions from 1→ ta(ri)→ λ→ tb(ri)→ 0
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as ri ranges from 0 → ∞. These results motivate the following Nash Equilibrium for a
single group.
Theorem 2.1. Let r⃗ denote the list of ri values for the N members of the group, sorted
from least to greatest. There exists a number R1 > 0 that is a function of r⃗, N , λ, and
β such that, if all individuals with ri < R1 choose ti = 1, all with ri = R1 choose ta
with a potentially specific value of a, all with R1 < ri < R1 + β choose ti = λ, all with
ri = R1+β choose tb with a potentially specific value of b, and all with ri > R1+β choose
ti = 0, the system is in a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Consider a set of nonnegative integer values N1, Na, Nλ, Nb, and N0 such that the
first N1 members of r⃗ choose ti = 1, the next Na choose ti = ta = a + (1 − a)λ with
0 ≤ a ≤ 1, the next Nλ choose ti = λ, the next Nb choose ti = tb = bλ with 0 ≤ b ≤ 1,
and the final N0 choose ti = 0. For any given individual, Ti = T − ti, where T =
∑
j tj
for the state we are examining. Then for all those individuals choosing ti = 1, Ti = T − 1






Hence, so long as ri < R1, for i ≤ N1, all of the N1 individuals will be making their
optimal choice and not want to unilaterally switch. Similarly, for the individuals choosing
ti = λ, Ti = T − λ and the upper bound of (2.6) becomes R1 while the lower bound
of (2.7) becomes 1/2
√
NT + β = R1 + β. So, as long as R1 < ri < R1 + β for all
N1 + Na < i ≤ N1 + Na + Nλ, all of the Nλ individuals will be making their optimal
choice and not want to unilaterally switch. In this same way, so long as ri > R1 + β for all
i > N1+Na+Nλ+Nb all the N0 individuals will also be making their optimal choice. For
those choosing ti = ta, Ti = T − ta, so that (2.4) will be satisfied regardless of ta so long as
ri = 1/2
√
NT = R1, which is the case for these individuals, so they are also playing their




NT + β = R1 + β, which is the case for these individuals. Since all ri values
are accounted for and no individual can increase utility by unilaterally switching strategy,
this is a Nash Equilibrium.
We now show that such an equilibrium always exists. First, let F (r) be the number of
individuals with ri ≤ r, and let P (r) be the number of individuals with ri = r. Then the
total amount of time spent in group activities is
T = [F (R1)− P (R1)] + [a+ (1− a)λ]P (R1)+
λ [F (R1 + β)− F (R1)− P (R1 + β)] + bλP (R1 + β)
= (1− λ) [F (R1)− (1− a)P (R1)] + λ [F (R1 + β)− (1− b)P (R1 + β)] . (2.10)





Then, so long as an R1 (and potentially corresponding values for a and/or b) exists that
satisfies both (2.10) and (2.11), the Nash Equilibrium above exists. But this can always
be made the case: (2.11) is a monotonically-decreasing, continuous function taking on all
positive values as R1 ranges from 0+ to∞, while (2.10) is a non-decreasing function that
can be made to take on any value between its minimum of λ[F (β)−P (β)] to its maximum
of N by adjusting a and/or b as needed as R1 ranges from 0 to∞. Hence, the two curves can
be made to intersect, and this intersection point is unique with regard to R1 and therefore
T , so the Nash Equilibrium exists and the various Nx values are all unique.
An illustration of the Nash Equilibrium is shown in Fig. 2.1. Here, ten individuals
with ri values shown as blue X marks on the horizontal axis are members of a group with
λ = 0.25 and β = 0.15. The solid red curve is (2.11), while the discontinuous black curve
















Figure 2.1: An illustration of the existence and determination of the Nash Equilibrium for
the single group case. Here, the ri of the group members are shown as blue X marks on the
horizontal axis, the solid red curve is (2.11), and the discontinuous black curve is (2.10).
case). Note the single point of intersection of these two curves, guaranteeing that the Nash
Equilibrium exists, which in this case occurs at the r value of one of the group members,
and is labeled as R1. Then the two individuals with ri < R1 will choose ti = 1, the single
individual at ri = R1 will choose ti = a+ (1− a)λ with a ≈ 0.62, the six individuals with
R1 < ri < R1+β will choose ti = λ, and the one remaining individual will choose ti = 0.
2.3 Ideal Strictness and Punishment Levels
The previous section considers how a variety of individuals with varying ri will determine
their ti given the group strictness λ and punishment factor β. Here, we study a somewhat
different problem, focusing on one value of ri at a time and asking what the ideal strictness
and punishment factor are for individuals with that particular ri value. To do so, we assume
that N people with identical parameters ri = r are originally unaffiliated, meaning they
are not currently a member of any group and receive only Uout. They would like to form
a group together of strictness λ to get a higher payoff than being unaffiliated. We assume
for now that, since all individuals have the same ri, they will all choose the same ti; we
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will prove later that this can be made to be so. If this is the case, then they will all choose
ti = λ of the group they have formed; choosing ti = 0 leaves them no better off than
they currently are being unaffiliated, and choosing ti = 1, ta, or tb would be equivalent to




λ+ r(1− λ) . (2.12)
This payoff is maximized for ideal strictness λ = 1/4r2. Note, though, that since λ ≤ 1 by
definition, if r < 1/2, the ideal strictness is simply λ = 1. For this reason, in the remainder
of the paper we generally assume that all ri ≥ 1/2. If the group adopts the ideal strictness
level, they will end up with a maximized utility of Umax = r + 1/4r.
However, we must now determine whether the above situation is a Nash Equilibrium as
discussed above. Specifically, with all N individuals having the same ri = r, in a group of
strictness λ = 1/4r2, we require all individuals playing ti = λ to result in a threshold R1
such that R1 < r < R1+β, which is the condition needed for the Nash Equilibrium. In this
case, T = λN , so that R1 = r/N < r from (2.11). But, this is only a Nash Equilibrium if
r < R1 + β, so that we need β > r(1 − 1/N). To allow for a group of any potential size,
then, we could simply use β = r. With this being the case, the total punishment for a person
were she to choose ti = 0 instead of ti = λ would be P = βλ =
√
λ/2 ≤ 1/2, which is
less than the Uin received from being in the group. Hence, a minimum punishment level
is necessary to guarantee that no individuals in this group will be tempted to switch from
ti = λ to ti = 0, but this punishment level is bounded and need not completely remove the
benefits of being in the group (Uin) to be entirely effective. This is a classical example of
the “free-rider” problem, which in this case can be solved with sufficient punishment for
free-riding.
It is possible to set a bounded punishment level that dissuades any of the ri = r mem-
bers of the group from deviating from the choice ti = λ without completely removing that
member’s Uin. But can the same be done to dissuade outsiders with differing ri > r from
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joining the group and playing ti = 0? Imagine another individual with ri > r joining the
existing group, so that N increases by one, but λ and β are as indicated above. Any such
individual can only decrease the value of R1, but never so much that R1 + β < r given our
β value, so all the original individuals will always continue to play ti = λ. However, the
added individual will only free ride if her utility from doing so is greater than her utility
from choosing ti = λ. That happens if
√
λ+ ri(1− λ) <
√
λN/(N + 1) + ri − βλ , (2.13)
which would only necessarily be the case in arbitrarily sized groups if β < ri. At the same
time, though, this new individual will only join the group to free-ride if the utility of doing
so is greater than the utility of simply being unaffiliated, which only happens if
√
λN/(N + 1) + ri − βλ > ri . (2.14)
So, by choosing β =
√
N/λ(N + 1), the group can prevent all possible free riding. Of
course, in this case the punishment for free riding is P = βλ ≈
√
λ, so that the punishment
is to simply remove the entirety of Uin.
One can also consider what may happen if an individual with ri < r joins the group.
Again, note that adding such individuals can only decrease R1, but never so much so that
R1 + β < r, so any such added individuals will never cause the existing group members
to become free riders. The newly added individual can therefore only play ti = 1, λ,
or a linear combination of the two (ta). Upon adding such an individual, the intersection
between (2.10) and (2.11) can only occur at one of three places: at an R1 > ri where (2.10)
yields λN + 1 and ti = 1, at R1 = ri where (2.10) yields λ(N + 1) + a(1 − λ) and ti
is a linear combination of one and λ, or at an R1 < ri where (2.10) yields λ(N + 1) and
ti = λ. But in the first case, R1 = 1/2
√
(N + 1)(1 + λN) < 1/2 so ri cannot satisfy
ri < R1, as we have already constrained all ri ≥ 1/2, so the first case is impossible and
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the new individual does not play ti = 1. The third case gives R1 = r/(N + 1), so any
ri > r/(N + 1) will cause the new individual to choose ti = λ, which is quite likely in
a very large group. Finally, any 1/2 ≤ ri ≤ r/(N + 1) will cause this individual to play
a linear combination of one and λ. In fact, this argument is easily extended to a situation
in which there are many ri values present, all ≤ r, in which case at most the individual(s)




We now turn to a more dynamic situation, in which case there are potentially several groups
to choose from, and individuals may be changing their affiliations over time. The overall
goal of the model will be to describe how the sizes of religious groups vary over time, given
the distribution of r values in the population, the strictness values of the various groups,
and other considerations discussed below. This variation is of course directly determined
by the rate at which individuals enter a group versus the rate at which they leave a group,
and these rates are themselves determined by two mechanisms that we will consider: 1)
birth and death of group members and 2) individuals switching group affiliation. Both
factors are important for understanding the trajectory of religious group membership [11].
We cover each effect separately below, and summarize the model in Fig. 3.1.
Before describing these effects in detail, we define a few more aspects of the model.
First, we assume that the values ri for all of the individuals within the entire society, en-
compassing all existing groups, are derived from a probability density R(r). Second, we
will at times wish to consider a special group known as the “unaffiliated group” whose
strictness is by definition 0 and for whose “members” there is no Uin. As the name implies,
this group really encompasses all those individuals who are not affiliated with any standard
group with λ > 0; as such, these individuals are not partaking in any in-group activities
whatsoever and all choose ti = 0.
Given the results above regarding ideal strictness and punishment levels, we make the
following simplification moving forward. Specifically, we will assume that all groups will
select a β that dissuades any possible free-riding, and that therefore all of the members of
any group will simply play ti = λ. The only approximation involved in this assumption is
that we are ignoring the possibility of the member(s) with the smallest ri values playing a
15
Figure 3.1: A flowchart detailing the various pieces of the multigroup model.
linear combination of one and λ, but this is a very borderline case that should not affect the
remainder of the results.
3.1 Birth, Death, and Inheritance
We assume that each group has a per capita birth rate bg, which could potentially be group
dependent, but that each group has the same per capita death rate d. When individuals
die, they are simply removed from the population, thus decreasing Ng by 1 for the group to
which they belonged. When individuals are born, it is assumed that their initial affiliation is
the same as that of their parent(s), so they will increase Ng by 1 for the group that they are
born into. In addition, whenever a new individual is born, with probability z his ri is equal
to that of his parent and with probability 1−z his ri is taken randomly from the distribution
R(r). Parameter z thus captures the degree of in-group cultural transmission from parent
to child. If all individuals exhibit the same birth rate, this mechanism will cause R(r) to be
stationary in time, in expectation.
16
3.2 Changing Affiliation
We assume that every individual has one chance in their life to change their group affilia-
tion. This opportunity is given to each individual effectively directly after his or her birth,
for simplicity, though this is meant to capture the possibility of switching groups once an
individual becomes an independent adult.
Group switching is conceptualized in the following way for individual i who is currently
a member of group g and values out-group activities at rate ri. First, given the set of
M groups and their corresponding strictness values λg′ , individual i could in principal
associate with any of the groups g′ and thereby obtain utility
Uig′ =
√
λg′ + ri(1− λg′) . (3.1)
In a system with perfect and complete information, each individual would simply de-
termine which g′ provides the maximum utility and choose that group. For M groups with
strictnesses λ0 = 0 < λ1 < λ2 < · · · < λM−1, we define cutoff values rg in the out-group
rate distribution such that individuals with r values in (rg+1, rg) would get their maximal
utility within the group with strictness λg. By finding the specific r value that would have
an equal payoff between the two groups λg+1 and λg, we determine that the cutoff between




λg) where g = 1 . . .M−1; we define r0 =∞ and
rM = 1/2 for notational convenience. If R(r) is stationary in time and in expectation, then
a model in which all players simply choose their optimal group would immediately place
all individuals in their ideal group, and the system would remain in that same configuration
for all time, in expectation, regardless of birth and death. We refer to this simple model as
the “stationary model”.
However, the simple “stationary model” neglects an important aspect of switching reli-
gious groups, which is the exposure to the group: if one is exposed to members of a group
frequently, the chance of switching to that group should be higher than that of switching
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to a group whose members you have never met, all else being equal. This motivates us to
define what we will call the exposure probability of an individual currently in group g to








where s > 0 is a model parameter and Ng is the number of members in group g.
Underlying this exposure probability is the assumption that during out-group time, all
members of society are well mixed. Then, for any given out-group chance encounter of an
individual, the probability that the person met is in group g′ is simply proportional to the
number of people from g′ who are spending time out of group at that moment, which is
(1 − λg′)Ng′ . Of course, the number of out-group chance encounters that an individual in
g experiences throughout her life up until the moment she may select to switch groups is
proportional to the amount of time she spends in general outside the group, represented by
the s(1 − λg) term. Then, αgg′ is the probability that our individual has had at least one
encounter with a person from group g′ by the time she may choose to switch groups. The
exceptions to (3.2) are for the case g′ = g, in which case αgg = 1 since everyone has had
encounters with members of their own group for certain, and the case g′ = 0, for which
we also assume αg0 = 1 since one need not encounter unaffiliated individuals in order to
“join” the unaffiliated “group”.
Given then the utilities Uig′ and exposure probabilities αgg′ , switching for individual i
currently in g occurs in the following way. First, we sort the groups such that g′ is in front
of g′′ if
1. Uig′ > Uig′′ .
2. Uig′ = Uig′′ and αgg′ > αgg′′ .
3. Uig′ = Uig′′ , αgg′ = αgg′′ and λg′ < λg′′ .
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This leaves us with a permutation of groups, denoted by σ(j) where j = 0, 1, . . . ,M − 1.
Then we simply march down the permutation starting with j = 0, at each point determining
whether i chooses group σ(j) via the exposure probability αgσ(j) until she probabilistically
joins a group. This procedure is attempting to assign every individual to her highest utility
group, but only does so if there was sufficient exposure to that group, else the next highest
utility group is attempted, etc. Note that this procedure will always end with i joining some
group, because αgg and αg0 are both 1, so in the extreme case she can always stay in her
current group or become unaffiliated.
Note that if person i spends all her time in in-group activities, which should only occur
if λg = 1, then all the αgg′ are zero except for αg0 and αgg. Such an individual has no
opportunity to switch to any but the unaffiliated group, or simply remain in her current
group. Furthermore, if any group g has λ = 1, then for any other group g′ ̸= g, 0 we
have αg′g = 0. Therefore, the size of a group with strictness 1 will never grow due to
new members joining from the outside, and can only drop if members choose to become
unaffiliated.
3.3 Differential Equation Model for Group Size
Given the dynamics specified above, one could implement a discrete, agent-based model
immediately to observe how the system evolves. Here, we instead cast the problem in terms
of ordinary differential equations, so as to achieve a greater ability to understand the model
analytically. The assumption here is that the overall population size is very large, so that
taking an expectation of the stochastic dynamics may yield a good approximation to the
discrete case.
We assume going forward that no two groups share the same strictness level: λg ̸= λg′
for all g ̸= g′. Then, given the number of groups M and their various strictness levels, each
potential r value from the distribution R(r) can be classified by its permutation σr(j) of the
groups strictly in terms of the utility of the groups to a person with parameter ri = r. As
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such, we can divide the total population into a finite number S of subpopulations, each of
which is labeled by the permutation of groups σ that all members of that subpopulation have
in common. Then our model need only track the number of individuals in group g that are
members of subpopulation σ over time, labeled as ngσ(t). Note that
∑J
σ ngσ(t) = Ng(t).
We define the fraction of the distribution R(r) that encompasses subpopulation σ to be fσ.






bg′ [zng′σ + fσ(1− z)Ng′ ] pg′gσ . (3.3)
Here, we have scaled time by the common death rate d, so that bg is now the relative (to
death) birth rate of group g. The new term pg′gσ is simply the probability that when a
person currently in g′ is given the opportunity to switch groups, she switches to group g,









That is, in order to choose g given preference σ, one needs to not choose any of the groups
σ(j) with j < J that are higher in the ordering, and then needs to choose to join g, with all
of the probabilities dictated by the various αg′σ(j).
In general it is more convenient to consider the size of a given population relative to
the total population size N , so we now recast (3.3) in terms of new variables ñgσ = ngσ/N
and Ñg = Ng/N . Given that the differential equation for N in time units scaled by the





















where the p values are the same as above, and the α values still follow (3.2) but with Nj
replaced with Ñj . In general we will use (3.5) from now on with all tildes dropped, and
all references to sizes of populations will be scaled by total population size, which may or
may not be constant.
3.4 Two Group Case
In this section, we present some analytical results for the simplest non-trivial case, that of
two groups. The groups here are the unaffiliated group labeled 0 and an affiliated group
labeled 1 with some strictness value λ1 = λ > 0. Since there are only two groups, we
only have S = 2 subpopulations with different ordering preferences σ, {0, 1} and {1, 0},
which we will refer to as simply σ0 = 0 and σ1 = 1, respectively. Then, let f1 = f so that
f0 = 1− f1 = 1− f . Finally, note that N0 +N1 = 1.
According to the rules of switching,
1. People can always stay in the original group if they prefer that group. Thus α00 =
α11 = 1. Then p000 = p111 = 1 and p010 = p101 = 0.
2. People can always switch to the unaffiliated group if they prefer it. Thus α10 = 1.
Then p100 = 1 and p110 = 0.
3. People who are originally in group 0 and prefer group 1 can switch to group 1 with
probability






4. People who are originally in group 0 and prefer group 1 will nonetheless stay in
group 0 with probability p001 = 1− p.
First, consider the case in which all birth rates have the same value, which we set to
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= −n00 + z(n00 + n10) + (1− f)(1− z)
dn01
dt






= −n11 + [zn01 + f(1− z)N0] p+ [zn11 + f(1− z)N1]
(3.7)
At equilibrium, then, we clearly have n10 = 0 and n00 = 1 − f . Given that the total
population size adds to unity, we can recast the remaining two equations in terms of a
single variable, which we will choose to be n11 = N1 = n. For notational simplicity, let
K = z + f(1− z) (so f ≤ K ≤ 1). Then at equilibrium we have
dn
dt








In the extreme case λ = 1, we have p = 0 so that at equilibrium n = 0 unless K = 1,
which can only happen if f = 1 and/or z = 1. For cases λ < 1, we have the following
result:
Theorem 3.1. If g′(0) = fs(1 − λ) +K − 1 ≤ 0, then the equation dn
dt
= g(n) has only
the trivial equilibrium point n = 0 and it is stable. Otherwise the trivial equilibrium point
becomes unstable and the equation has another stable equilibrium at a point n0 in (0, f).
Proof. To prove our claim, we first note that g(0) = 0 and g(f) = f(1−K)(p(f)−1) < 0
since p(f) < 1 when f < 1. We will then need to take the first and second order derivatives
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of g(n):
g′(n) =(f −Kn)p′(n)−Kp(n) +K − 1 (3.10)
g′′(n) =(f −Kn)p′′(n)− 2Kp′(n) , (3.11)
where




p′′(n) =s(1− λ) (1− n)
s−2
(1− λn)s+2
[−(s− 1)(1− λ) + 2λ(1− n)] . (3.13)
Therefore,
g′′(n) =s(1− λ) (1− n)
s−2
(1− λn)s+2
((f −Kn) [−(s− 1)(1− λ) + 2λ(1− n)]−
2K(1− n)(1− λn))
=s(1− λ) (1− n)
s−2
(1− λn)s+2
[(2K + (s− 1)(1− λ)K − 2λf)n−
(2K + (s− 1)(1− λ)f − 2λf)]. (3.14)
Note that s(1− λ) (1−n)
s−2
(1−λn)s+2 > 0 on [0, 1). Let us consider the function
h(n) = (2K + (s− 1)(1− λ)K − 2λf)n− (2K + (s− 1)(1− λ)f − 2λf), (3.15)
which is a linear function of n. The slope of h can be rewritten as
(1 + λ)K + s(1− λ)K − 2λf ≥ (1 + λ)K − 2λf > 0, (3.16)
since 0 < λ < 1, s > 0, and 0 < f ≤ K ≤ 1. Similarly, the negative intercept of h can be
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rewritten as
2K + sf(1− λ)− (1 + λ)f ≥ 2K − (1 + λ)f > 0. (3.17)
So h(n) is an increasing function that attains 0 at
n∗ =
2K + (s− 1)(1− λ)f − 2λf
2K + (s− 1)(1− λ)K − 2λf
. (3.18)
If s ≤ 1 then since K ≥ f , n∗ ≥ 1. So in this case g′′(n) < 0 on [0, 1) so that g′(n)
is strictly decreasing on [0, 1). So, if g′(0) > 0 there exists one non-trivial zero point n0 of
g(n) on [0, 1) with n0 < f and g′(n0) < 0; otherwise we only have a trivial zero point of
g(n) at n = 0.
If s > 1, then n∗ < 1, so g′(n) is decreasing on [0, n∗) and increasing on (n∗, 1). We
notice that
−h(f) =2K + (s− 1)(1− λ)f − 2λf − f(2K + (s− 1)(1− λ)K − 2λf) (3.19)
=(2K − 2λf)(1− f) + (s− 1)(1− λ)f(1−K) (3.20)
>(2K − 2λf)(1− f) (3.21)
>0 (3.22)
That implies f < n∗. So similar to the first case, we have if g′(0) > 0 there exists one non-
trivial zero point n0 of g(n) on [0, f) and g′(n0) < 0. Furthermore, since g′(1) = −1 < 0,
g′ remains negative on (n0, 1), so there are no other zero points of g in the interval (n0, 1).
If g′(0) < 0 on the other hand, we only have a trivial zero point of g(n) at n = 0.


































(n0) = 0 (3.25)
By Theorem 3.1, we have ∂g
∂n
(n0) < 0. And f −Kn0 > f(1 −K) > 0 since n0 < f .
Note that f is given by the fraction of R(r) for which being in group 1 is preferable to





Hence, f ′(λ) < 0. Moreover, the probability





(n0) < 0. Therefore, according to (3.23), ∂n0∂λ < 0.
In (3.24), (−p(n0) + fp(n0) + 1)n0 > 0 as p(n0) < 1. This gives ∂n0∂z > 0.
We also notice that since 1−n0
1−λn0 < 1, p is increasing in s implying
∂p
∂s
(n0) > 0. There-
fore (3.25) provides that ∂n0
∂s
> 0.
Summarizing the results above, the group with strictness λ > 0 will only survive as a
finite fraction of the population at equilibrium if fs(1−λ)+f(1−z) > 1−z. Presumably
the inheritance rate z and the parameter s are not under the control of any of the groups,
but λ, and thereby f , are chosen by each individual group. Note that f is decreasing in λ,
so that more strict groups are more apt to have a small population or even die out over time
than less strict groups. And, for any given R, z, and s, there is some maximal strictness
that the group can adopt and still continue to survive in the long run.
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Raising the probability of inheritance z will tend to prevent group 1 from dying out;
see Fig. 3.2. Inheriting the r value from their parents means that the children also have the
same preference as their parents. Hence, if somebody is already in her optimal group, her
descendants who inherit her r value are not going to make any switch, causing the group
to maintain its size from internal birth more so than in cases where inheritance is low. In
an extreme case that z = 1 and everybody can take the r value from her ancestors, at the
equilibrium, everybody will stay in her favorite group.
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Figure 3.2: The size of group 1 at equilibrium is plotted as a function of its strictness λ for
varying values of z, with s = 0.75 fixed and the distribution R(r) chosen at each λ such
that f = 0.5.
Increasing the model parameter s has a similar effect; see Fig. 3.3. That is because the
larger s is, the greater the αgg′’s are, so there is a higher probability for people to switch
to their optimal group. When s goes to∞, α0,1 goes to 1 unless λ1 = 1. In this extreme
case, everybody will end up in their optimal group if λ1 ̸= 1. On the other hand, when s
goes to 0, α0,1 goes to 0. So people in group 0 preferring group 1 are never capable to make
the switch. However, people in group 1 can always become unaffiliated if this is a better
choice. Then group 1 keeps losing people and will eventually die out.
The results above only apply to the case in which the two groups have a common birth
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Figure 3.3: The size of group 1 at equilibrium is plotted as a function of its strictness λ for
varying values of s, with z = 0.5 fixed and the distribution R(r) chosen at each λ such that
f = 0.5.
rate, and show that in some circumstances the strict group will die out. In reality we often
see that stricter religious groups have higher birth rates relative to less strict groups [11,
18]. A high birth rate in the strict group can counteract the fact that there is relatively
low conversion of external individuals to the group, given low exposure to the group and
possibly an inherently smaller fraction of the population for whom such a strict group
is ideal. This in turn could potentially allow a stricter group to continue to survive by
increasing its internal growth rate. Therefore, we now consider the case in which group
0 retains birth rate 1, but group 1 has birth rate b ≥ 1. Then the differential equations




= z(n00 + bn10) + (1− f)(1− z)(N0 + bN1)(1− n00)
dn01
dt
= [zn01 + f(1− z)N0)] (1− p)− (N0 + bN1)n01
dn10
dt
= −(N0 + bN1)n10
dn11
dt
= [zn01 + f(1− z)N0] p+ b [zn11 + f(1− z)N1]− (N0 + bN1)n11
(3.26)
As in the case above, we again find that at equilibrium n10 = 0, so we can cast the equi-
27
librium equations in terms of n11 = N1 = n, with N0 = 1 − n still. After some algebraic
manipulations we find that the population n at equilibrium satisfies
{
−K(b− 1)n2 + n [(b− 1)(Kz + f(1− z))−K(1− z)] + f(1− z)
}
p(n)+{
−(b− 1)2n2 + n(b− 1)(bK + z − 2) + (1− z)(bK − 1)
}
n = gb(n) = 0 . (3.27)
Then the following result holds:
Theorem 3.3. For any 0 < λ ≤ 1, there exists a minimal birthrate bmin that allows for
survival of the stricter group at equilibrium.
Proof. Note gb(0) = 0, while gb(1) = b(K − 1) < 0. Then if g′b(0) > 0, gb must have at
least one root on the interval (0, 1). The derivative
g′b(0) = fs(1− λ) + bK − 1 .
So, if b > bmin ≡ [1− fs(1− λ)] /K, the stricter group can survive with a finite fraction
of the population at equilibrium.
The result above highlights the fact that for very strict groups, a higher than average
birthrate may be necessary for long term survival, but also guarantees that this is always
possible, at least in the case of two groups. Also, bmin is increasing in λ, so the stricter
a group wishes to be, the greater the birthrate necessary for survival, assuming the group
could not survive at b = 1. Finally, note that the largest possible value of bmin, occurring
at λ = 1, could not be greater than 1/z, so any group with a birthrate higher than this is
guaranteed to survive regardless of their λ. Fig. 3.4 illustrates that if the strict group has a
higher birth rate, while all the other parameters are fixed, it can still survive.
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Figure 3.4: The size of group 1 at equilibrium is plotted as a function of its strictness λ for
varying values of b, with s = 0.75 and z = 0.5 fixed and the distribution R(r) chosen at
each λ such that f = 0.5.
3.5 Three or More Groups
In the previous section, we determined the conditions under which a single group with pos-
itive strictness level may survive at equilibrium alongside the unaffiliated group. Of course,
in the real religious marketplace, many groups simultaneously coexist, so one would ide-
ally want to analyze multigroup cases within the context of our model. Unfortunately, the
model’s complexity increases very rapidly with the number of groups due to two main fac-
tors: the possibility of inheritance of r values and the rapid growth in the number of group
preference orderings σ with number of groups M .
For example, consider now a scenario where M = 3. Then there are four different σ
orderings of the groups that can occur: σ0 = {0, 1, 2}, σ1 = {1, 0, 2}, σ2 = {1, 2, 0}, and
σ3 = {2, 1, 0}. Given an inheritance level z ̸= 0, we must keep track of the number of in-
dividuals of each ordering within each of the three groups, leading to a twelve-dimensional
system, which can be reduced by one dimension down to 11 due to the constraint that the
total population size is 1. Due to the dynamics of group switching, some of the subpopula-
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tions will simply exponentially decay, namely n10, n20, and n21, leaving us with effectively
an eight-dimensional system for the case of only three groups. This unfortunately makes
analytical work even for this small number of groups quite difficult. We therefore pro-
ceed using numerical simulations, a method that has been used before to study religious
markets and the dynamics of religious group growth [15, 16, 19]. We solve the ode (3.3)
numerically with the initial condition such that everybody starts in their favorite group and
determine that the equilibrium is reached if the numerical derivative at this point is smaller
than a very small threshold.
Consider first the results presented in Fig. 3.5, where we explore the equilibrium sizes of
each of three groups as the strictnesses of the two affiliated groups vary, given the dynamics
of (3.5) and an initial condition in which all groups are equally sized. In each figure, we
fix the strictness value of one of the groups, which we refer to as the “preexisting” group,
and plot the equilibrium group sizes as a function of the strictness of the third group, which
we refer to as the “new” group; this choice of terminology will be explained below. In all
cases, we have chosen parameter values s = 3 and z = 0.5, use uniform birthrates, and
use a lognormal distribution for R so that r − 1/2 ∼ Lognormal(µ, v2), where µ = −1/2
and v = 2. The last assumption reflects the fact that income distributions are typically
understood to be lognormal [20], and our R distribution can be interpreted as capturing
the value of outside-group activities including work for pay. In the two group case, these
parameters and distribution would allow a single group with strictness up to approximately
0.83 to survive alongside the unaffiliated group, without the need to increase their birthrate
beyond the baseline value. We will refer to this strictness value as the absolute maximal
strictness in our discussions below.
Some immediate observations stand out from Fig. 3.5. First, if the strictness of the
new group is too high, they cannot sustain their population and eventually die out, which
is to be expected. Further, the maximal strictness value that the new group can adopt and
still survive is always less than the absolute maximal strictness of 0.83, again as expected.
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium sizes of three groups as the strictnesses of the two affiliated groups
vary. In all cases, s = 3, z = 0.5, birthrates are uniform, and the distribution R is lognormal
with parameters given in the text. (Left) The preexisting group has strictness 0.25; (Center)
the preexisting group has strictness 0.50; (Right) the preexisting group has strictness 0.75.
Perhaps less obvious, though, is the fact that the maximal strictness the new group can adopt
is not monotonic in the strictness of the preexisting group. When the preexisting group has
rather low strictness, the new group may adopt relatively high strictness values and still
survive, and as the strictness of the preexisting group increases toward approximately 0.5
in this case, the maximal strictness of the new group is reduced. But, as the strictness of
the preexisting group rises above 0.5, the maximal strictness of the new group also rises.
Another observation is that, as the strictness of the preexisting group increases, its
maximal possible size at equilibrium decreases, as expected; with higher strictness fewer
people rank the group highly in their group ordering, and it is less probable for those who
do to join the group given the probabilities α. But, more interestingly, the minimal possible
size – over strictnesses of the new group – of the preexisting group is not monotonic in the
preexisting group’s strictness. When the preexisting group’s strictness is very low, a new
group with only a slightly higher strictness value will steal most of the members from the
preexisting group, making the lowest size for the preexisting group quite small. Similarly,
if the preexisting strictness is quite high, any sufficiently low strictness for the new group
will completely eliminate the preexisting group. On the other hand, when the strictness of
the preexisting group is more moderate – say near 0.5 in this case – their minimal size is
still a relatively large fraction of the overall population.
These two observations become quite important when we imagine groups choosing
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their strictness levels in a strategic way. Consider a scenario in which only a single, pre-
existing group exists alongside the unaffiliated group. We might imagine that this group is
free to choose whatever strictness level it would like for itself, but should do so in a way
that will optimize some objective function. Suppose that the group’s main concern is that
it have a high membership. Then, if this preexisting group were to ignore the possibility
of any new groups forming or breaking away from it, it ought to choose an arbitrarily low
strictness level, and thereby recruit almost everyone. However, this choice would leave the
preexisting group very vulnerable should a third group form, since, as observed above, the
new group could easily steal away almost all of the preexisting groups members by choos-
ing its own strictness carefully. To guard against this, then, the preexisting group should
instead choose a somewhat moderate strictness value, such that a new group entering would
a) have fewer possible strictness values to choose from in order to survive and b) have a
minimized possible impact on the size of the preexisting group. Note that this finding is
similar that those found in prior studies [8, 9] but with the added twist that the new group
must avoid being too strict to prevent from eventually dying out due to loss of members
by insufficient births into the group. We thus see strong market pressures toward moderate
religion that can only be countered with sufficiently high birth rates in the strictest groups.
More insights into the behavior of the three group case can by seen by examining
Fig. 3.6. Here, we display the rates at which individuals transition between the three groups
– given by the numbers displayed above the corresponding arrows – and at which they are
retained from the births within the group – given by the numbers on the loops starting and
ending on the same group – once the system has reached equilibrium. Initial conditions
are that every ngσ has an equal size, and the equilibrium group sizes are N0 ≈ 0.344,
N1 ≈ 0.429, and N2 ≈ 0.228. In this case, we have employed the same lognormal R(r)
distribution used to construct Fig. 3.5, have chosen s = 5 and z = 0.5 with constant birth
rates, and chosen strictness levels for the two affiliated groups such that the fraction of peo-
ple who rank each group at the top of their ordering is equal for all three groups. Because
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Figure 3.6: Scaled flowrates of newly born individuals between groups or remaining within
a given group at equilibrium. See text for parameters used in this simulation.
of this, no group in this case has an inherent advantage merely due to the number of people
who might prefer that group above all others, which causes the resulting dynamics to be
more dominated by the probabilities of switching directly.
Figure 3.6 reveals an interesting behavior not seen in prior models. Note that there is
a greater flow from the high strictness group to unaffiliated than from high strictness to
moderate strictness. Prior models based purely on ideal strictness levels [7, 8, 9] would
generally predict the opposite, as individuals from the highest strictness group would tend
to choose the next lowest strictness group when switching groups instead of choosing to not
affiliate with any group. In our model, however, the transition probabilities greatly affect
the model outcome. It is much more likely for a member of the high strictness group to
transition to the unaffiliated group than the moderate group, all else being equal, because
the individuals who are dissatisfied in the high-strictness group do not get enough exposure
to the moderate group to make switching to that moderate group likely. The dissatisfied
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individuals become unaffiliated because that option is the only alternative that is assumed
to not require prior exposure.
Moving beyond three groups, the system becomes ever more complex and even simple
numerical experiments become unwieldy as there are too many parameters to vary. But,
as an example, we do provide simulated results in the case of eight groups here. For these
simulations, a lognormal R(r) was chosen, and the strictnesses of the eight groups are
selected such that each of the eight groups has an equal fraction of the population that
ranks that group most highly. We use initial conditions such that every subpopulation is
equally sized, and plot equilibrium sizes of the eight groups as functions of s (with z fixed
at 0.5) and z (with s fixed at 2) in Fig. 3.7. As is clear from Fig. 3.7, the relative sizes
of the groups at equilibrium varies significantly with s and z. Some interesting patterns
are evident. For example, some of the low strictness groups are among the smallest in
size, despite the fact that they are equally as preferred as other groups and generally more
probable to join. Specifically, the group with strictness 0.001 has a smaller population than
the group with strictness 0.003 under all parameters tested. Similarly, the 0.015 strictness
group has a smaller size than the 0.035 group under many parameters combinations. This
may be related to the phenomenon observed in the three group case, whereby a group could
steal away many members from a low strictness group by having a slightly higher strictness
value. At the higher end of the strictness scale, we find that the general trend is that the
highest strictness group does quite poorly, while the next two highest groups can do very
well. The origin of this effect is a bit clearer. For smaller s or z values, the 0.107 strictness
group evidently picks up all of the individuals who prefer it or the two highest groups; in
these parameter regimes, the lower α values for switching to the highest two groups cause
them to die out. But, as s or z is increased, the probability for joining the strictness 0.252
group increases enough so that it now is able to recruit many of those who prefer it, as well
as those that prefer the highest strictness group, all at the expense of the strictness 0.107
group, whose size drops accordingly.
34






































































Figure 3.7: Equilibrium sizes for a system with eight groups, as parameters s or z varies.
When not varying, s = 2 and z = 0.5. The distribution R(r) is lognormal, and strict-
nesses are chosen such that every group is ranked most highly by an equal fraction of the
population. Initial conditions set each subpopulation to an equal size.
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CHAPTER 4
NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN SIMULTANEOUS-MOVE TWO-GROUP GAMES
We now move to a higher level case where groups have the flexibility to choose their strict-
ness levels. There might be various types of groups with different utility functions and they
compete with each other. The strictness level of each group will be selected strategically in
order to maximize its own utility function in the group competition.
It is assumed that there are three types of groups:
Type A This type of group cares about the group production contributed by its members.
Its utility function is the average time spent in group activities.
Type B This type of group is concerned about its membership or size, hence the utility
function is the population of the group.
Type C This type of group would like to help everybody in the society to optimize their
payoffs. So its utility function is the average individual payoff over the whole popu-
lation.
The same simplification of the model as we discussed in the previous chapter is applied
here. Groups will have a sufficiently large punishment level β to deter free-riding and we
have the approximation that all the members of a group will play ti = λ. Therefore, the
goal of Type A groups is simplified to maximizing its strictness λ.
We are going to consider the simultaneous-move game between two groups of different
types (A vs B, A vs C, B vs C). Through the choice of strictness λ, each group is trying to
optimize the group payoff. However, due to the presence of the other group, the group goal
might be affected, which makes the problem game-theoretical. The main objective of this
chapter will be to study the Nash equilibrium of the two-group game.
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4.1 Stationary Model
4.1.1 Two-Group Game without Unaffiliated Group
We start the discussion with a simple scenario, where there are only 2 groups and everybody




λg + ri(1− λg),




λg′) will prefer group g to g′, while
people with r < rgg′ will prefer group g′ to g.
If group g has the same strictness level as g′, we distinguish these two groups in the
following way. The cutoff rgg′ can be considered as the limit when the strictness λg ap-
proaches λg′ from the left. So people with r > 1/(2
√
λg) are in group g while people with
r < 1/(2
√
λg) are in group g′. We refer to this scenario as undercutting. Alternatively, λg
can approach λg′ from the right, leaving people with r < 1/(2
√
λg) in group g while peo-
ple with r > 1/(2
√
λg) in group g′. This scenario is denoted as overcutting. The analysis
below shows that undercutting or overcutting make no difference in the utility functions of
a Type A or Type C group as the utilities are continuous. For a Type B group, its payoff
when λg = λg′ is assumed to be the larger of the one by undercutting and by overcutting so
that its utility is upper semi-continuous, as required by the proofs of Theorems 4.1 and 4.2.
To study the Nash equilibrium, we need to analyze the response of group strictness λ
given the strictness level of the other group λg. The objective function of Type A group
is independent of the choice of the other group. Hence the response of Type A group will
always be λ = 1 regardless of the value λg.
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1/2 R(r)dr) if λ = λg;∫ rg
1/2
R(r)dr if λg < λ ≤ 1,
(4.1)




λ) is the cutoff value of these 2 groups. If λ ≤ λg, to maximize
UB equates to minimizing the lower bound of the integral rg, which is further equivalent
to maximizing λ. So Type B group will undercut group g. On the other hand, if λ > λg,
a similar analysis suggests that type B group will overcut group g. The optimal payoff of
Type B group will be the larger of UB(λ−g ) and UB(λ
+
g ).





















λg + r(1− λg)]dr
if λg < λ ≤ 1.
(4.2)
Since everybody is able to switch to her favorite group, after introducing a Type C group,
the members of this group are the only ones who have an increase in their payoffs. There-
fore, the group goal can also be understood as to maximize the total increase in the payoffs
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λg + r(λg − λ)]dr











λg + r(λg − λ)]dr
if λg < λ ≤ 1.
UC(λg) is a continuous function. It is clear that undercutting or overcutting other groups
by choosing the same strictness will give a Type C group no increase in the payoff of its
members. Conversely, choosing a different strictness can at least attract and benefit some
fraction of the population. Therefore UC gets the global minimum at λ = λg.



















− r]dr if λg < λ ≤ 1.
We notice that limλ→0 U ′C(λ) = ∞, U ′C(1) < 0 as r ≥ 1/2 and λ = λg is the global
minimum of UC , so UC attains the maximum on (0, λg) at λ1 and the maximum on (λg, 1)
at λ2 where λ1 and λ2 are zero points of U ′C(λ). The optimal payoff of Type C group should
be the larger of UC(λ1) and UC(λ2). This group will choose between λ1 and λ2 whichever
makes UC larger. As λg varies, the global maximum might switch from one interval to the
other. Hence the response of Type C group might not depend continuously on the given λg.
Based on the analysis above, we are able to study the Nash equilibrium of this two-
group game. In the game between a Type A group and a Type B group, Type A group
will respond λA = 1 at all time. In the meantime, Type B group will either undercut or




λB) = 1/2. As
r ≥ 1/2, Type B group will undercut Type A group by choosing λB = 1−, taking all the
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population and eliminating its competitor completely.
The game between Type A group and Type C groups also has a pure Nash Equilibrium,
λA = 1 and










where the cutoff rg = 1/(1 +
√
λ). Type C group will choose a lower strictness than λA to
attract a fraction of the total population and raise their payoffs.
There is no pure Nash Equilibrium in the simultaneous-move game between Type B
and Type C groups. It is known that Type B group prefers the same strictness as the other
group while Type C group would rather have a different one. As a result, at no point in
[0, 1] × [0, 1] will both groups be at a utility maximum simultaneously, so there cannot
be a pure Nash Equilibrium. Theorem 4.1 guarantees the existence of the mixed Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1. There exists mixed Nash equilibrium of the game between Type B and Type
C groups
G = ([0, 1]× [0, 1], (UB, UC))
where UB and UC are defined in (4.1) and (4.2).
The proof of Theorem 4.1 can be found in the Appendix. To illustrate the mixed Nash
equilibria, we discretize the strategy space [0, 1] and approximate the game G by finite
games. We use Lemke-Howson algorithm [21, 22, 23] to compute the mixed Nash equilib-
ria of the finite approximation. Fig. 4.1 presents the mixed Nash equilibrium when the r
distribution is r − 1/2 ∼ Lognormal(µ, σ2) with µ = −1/2 and σ = 2, the same as in the
previous chapter. Type B group tends to choose a strictness near 0 while Type C group has
a probability around 0.41 to choose λ slightly above 0, a probability around 0.53 to choose
λ ≈ 0.455 and some very small probabilities to choose λ in between these two values.
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Strategy of Type B group
               in Game B vs C

































Strategy of Type C group
               in Game B vs C
Figure 4.1: Mixed Nash equilibria of finite approximation of game B vs C. Stationary
model without unaffiliated group is used. (Left) Strategy of Type B group; (Right) Strategy
of Type C group.
4.1.2 Two-Group Game with Unaffiliated Group
In this subsection, the unaffiliated group is taken into consideration. It is assumed that a
small minimum strictness level λmin exists in order to prevent overcutting of the unaffiliated
group.
Given the strictness levels of the three groups, 0 = λ0 < λg < λg′ , there are 2 cutoff
points r0g = 1/
√




λg′). The unaffiliated group will take the
population with r > r0g, group g will have the population with rgg′ < r < r0g and group g′
will contain the rest.













R(r)dr) if λ = λg;∫ rg
1/2
R(r)dr if λg < λ ≤ 1,
(4.3)
where r0 = 1/
√




λ). On the closed interval [λmin, λg], the max-
imum of UB can either be attained at the endpoints or at a point λ∗ in the interior where
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U ′B = 0. Hence the choice of Type B group will be the best of the following
1. λ = λmin, the minimum of allowed strictness levels;
2. λ = λ∗ ∈ (0, λg) if UB has local maxima on (0, λg);
3. λ = λ−g to undercut group g;
4. λ = λ+g to overcut group g.




























if λg < λ ≤ 1.
(4.4)
Since undercutting group g will never benefit Type C group, similar results apply here that
the response of Type C group is the better of the local maximum point on [λmin, λg) and
the local maximum point on (λg, 1].
We investigated the Nash equilibrium of this two-group game using some lognormal
distributions r − 1/2 ∼ Lognormal(µ, σ2). The minimum strictness λmin is 0.001. If Type
A group is in the game, it will always set its strictness λA to 1 regardless of the choice of
the other groups. Fig 4.2 shows the optimal choices of Type B and Type C groups given
that λA = 1 as µ and σ vary. When σ is small, the r values are close to the mean value. It
is easy to attract most people by placing the strictness level close to the average preferred
strictness. As µ grows, people tend to prefer less strict groups. So the response of Type B
group λB drops continuously from 1− to λmin. On the other hand, when σ is big, r values
are more widely spread. Putting strictness in (λmin, 1) might not be so appealing to Type B
group. Thus it instead chooses λB = 1− for small µ values and λB = λmin for big µ values.
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The response of Type C group λC decreases both in µ and in σ. That is because, when µ
increases, Type C group can obtain a larger population by choosing a smaller strictness;
when σ increases, more people prefer the Type A group, therefore Type C group will lower
its strictness to benefit more people from the unaffiliated group.









































Figure 4.2: Contour plots of the optimal choices of Type B and Type C groups given that
λA = 1 as µ and σ vary. (Left) Type B group; (Right) Type C group.
Theorem 4.2 guarantees the existence of the mixed Nash equilibrium in the game be-
tween Type B and Type C groups as long as λmin is sufficiently small. The proof is in the
appendix.
Theorem 4.2. There exists λ∗ > 0 such that if λmin < λ∗ then there exists mixed Nash
equilibrium of the game between Type B and Type C groups
G = ([λmin, 1]× [λmin, 1], (UB, UC))
where UB and UC are defined in (4.3) and (4.4).
However, there may also exist pure Nash equilibria in the game between Type B and
Type C groups. For example, with the same lognormal distribution of R as in the previous
discussions, namely r − 1/2 ∼ Lognormal(µ, σ2) with µ = −1/2 and σ = 2, there exists
a pure Nash equilibrium. Fig 4.3 shows the optimal responses of Type B group and Type C
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group as λg varies. The two curves intersects at (λB, λC) = (0.001, 0.382), which is a pure
Nash Equilibrium.
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Figure 4.3: The responses of Type B group and Type C group as λg varies and a zoomed-in
version near the intersection. The blue line presents the response λC in the vertical axis
given λB. The red line shows the response λB in the horizontal axis given λC .
4.2 Dynamic Model
In this section, we investigate the best responses of all types of groups given the strictness
of the other group λg on the prior dynamic model that assumes birth, death and inheritance
among group members and allows each individual to have one chance in their lifetime to
change their affiliation. The initial condition is chosen so that everybody is in their favorite
group.
We choose parameter values s = 3 and z = 0.5, use uniform birthrates, and use a
lognormal distribution for R so that r − 1/2 ∼ Lognormal(µ, σ2), where µ = −1/2 and
σ = 2. The minimum allowed strictness for any affiliation is λmin = 0.001. In the dynamic
model, the λ that maximize the group utility might possibly lead to zero population at the
equilibrium, but the group goal will never be accomplished in an empty group. As a result,
it is assumed as well that groups will attempt to maintain a minimum population ϵ = 0.01
in addition to optimizing their goals. We recall here that in the case with the unaffiliated
group and an affiliated one, a single group with strictness up to approximately 0.83 is able
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to survive alongside the unaffiliated group under these parameters and distribution. This
strictness is referred as the absolute maximal strictness.
Fig. 4.4 presents the optimal responses of all types of groups. The immediate observa-
tion comes out that if λg is larger than the absolute maximal strictness, it will be eliminated
in the game. In this case, each type of group is able to perform their optimal choice assum-
ing that only the unaffiliated group is present. So type A group will choose approximately
0.83; type B group will undercut the unaffiliated group from the right; and type C group
will select around 0.31.
The choice of Type A group λA depends continuously on λg, but not monotonically.
When λg is close to 0, λA is close to the absolute maximal strictness. As λg grows, Type
A group tends to lower its strictness at first. By doing so, this group will still maintain a
considerable fraction of the population that prefers it in order not to die out in the group
competition. When λg gets beyond approximately 0.58 but less than the absolute maximal
strictness, the best choice of Type A group becomes to undercut the other group. Any
strictness above that will result in a group population smaller than the threshold ϵ.
There is no continuous relationship between λB and λg. A small λg will cause type B
group to overcut it, stealing most of its members. When λg grows to around 0.5, it is more
appealing for type B group to select λmin instead. For an even larger λg, a choice between
0 and λg will give the largest population. This can also be seen in Fig. 3.5. If we view
the preexisting group as group g and the new group as the Type B group, then the figure
shows the population at the equilibrium with λg in 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and λB varying in [0, 1].
It is clear from the figure that when λg = 0.25, the optimal response is λB = 0.25; when
λg = 0.5, the optimal response becomes λB = 0; when λg = 0.75, the optimal response
lies near 0.1.
Type C group still will not pick the same strictness as other groups, which is as ex-
pected. Type C group will choose approximately 0.31 if there is only the unaffiliated group




C ; when 0.22 < λg < 0.83, the response λC < λ
∗
C . When λg > 0.83, λC = λ
∗
C
as the group g dies out. Comparing this with the response in the stationary model in Fig.
4.3, we have several observations. (1) With λg being small, Type C group tends to be more
strict in the stationary model. In the dynamic model, the probability α to switch to a high
strictness group is comparatively small, so Type C group needs to lower its strictness to in-
crease the chance of each individual switching to their optimal group in order to maximize
the group objective; (2) with a relatively larger λg around 0.7, the response in the dynamic
model is larger. That is because in this case, group g will have a much smaller size at the
equilibrium in the dynamic model than in the stationary model. A slightly larger strictness
will benefit those who prefer group g but end up on the Type C group.






































































































Figure 4.4: Optimal responses of the three types of groups as the strictness λg varies. In
all cases, s = 3, z = 0.5, birthrates are uniform, and the distribution R is lognormal with
parameters given in the text. (Left) the response of Type A group; (Center) the response of
Type B group; (Right) the response of Type C group.
By combining the responses of two different types of groups in one figure, we are able
to analyze the pure Nash equilibrium of the game by looking at the intersection of response
curves in Fig. 4.5. There is an intersection of the curves of Type A group and Type B group
around (λA, λB) = (0.587, 0.5), which is a pure Nash equilibrium of the game between
these two groups. Clearly no intersections exist in the figure A vs C or B vs C, which
implies that there are no pure Nash equilibria in the game involving Type C group. We
use Lemke-Howson algorithm to obtain mixed Nash equilibria of finite approximations
of games A vs C and B vs C respectively, as shown in Fig. 4.6. In the game A vs C,
Type A group chooses strictness levels in the interval [0.65, 0.71], while Type C group has
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a very large probability to play 0.185. In the game B vs C, the average strictness of the
strategy of Type B group is 0.27 while the average strictness of the strategy of Type C
group is 0.37. It is notable that the Nash equilibria of the games on the dynamic model are
obtained assuming that once the group strictnesses are selected, they will never be changed.
However, in the real religion market, groups can change their strictness levels over time,
leading to more complicated results.
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Figure 4.5: Responses of two of the three groups to various λg. In all cases, s = 3, z = 0.5,
birthrates are uniform, and the distribution R is lognormal with parameters given in the
text. (Top) the response of Type A and Type B group and the zoomed-in version near the
region where the two curves are close; (Bottom Left) the response of Type A and Type C
group; (Bottom Right) the response of Type B and Type C group.
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Strategy of Type A group
               in Game A vs C

































Strategy of Type C group
               in Game A vs C

































Strategy of Type B group
               in Game B vs C

































Strategy of Type C group
               in Game B vs C
Figure 4.6: Mixed Nash equilibria of finite approximations of games A vs C and B vs C.
Dynamic model is used. (Top Left) Strategy of Type A group in the Game A vs C; (Top
Right) Strategy of Type C group in the Game A vs C; (Bottom Left) Strategy of Type B
group in the Game B vs C; (Bottom Right) Strategy of Type C group in the Game B vs C.
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CHAPTER 5
SIMULATIONS ON SEQUENTIAL STACKELBERG GAMES
In the previous chapter, we analyzed the strategies of choosing strictness of various types
of groups in the game of two or three groups which come into existence simultaneously.
However, in the real religious marketplace, new affiliations are founded one at a time and
enter the market sequentially and successively. In this chapter, we are going to present
several simulation results of such procedures.
We will consider the same three types of groups as in the previous chapter. Originally
everybody is unaffiliated, in other words, there is only the unaffiliated group. The groups
then come into the marketplace sequentially. Each group has to take a different strictness
level from all the other existing groups in the market in order to distinguish itself. The
prioritized goal of all the group is to maintain a size above some population threshold ϵ
because if a group becomes too small, there is a high probability that it will disappear com-
pletely, given the group switching rules of the model. Once groups meet the requirement
of minimum population, they will maximize their own utilities. Moreover, when a group
is joining the marketplace, it thinks one more step ahead that there will be another group
following it. We refer to these two groups as the current group and the following group,
respectively, for short. The following group has an equal chance to be any one of the con-
sidered types. For example, if it is assumed that all the groups are of Type B, then the
following group can only be a Type B group; if all three types are taken into account, then
the following group has 1/3 chance to be each of those three types. The following group
also prioritizes getting a size at least ϵ. Given a λ value of the current group, the optimal
strictness of the following group λoptfoll of any given type can be calculated numerically.
The current group then chooses a strictness level λoptcurr that can maximize the expectation
of its utility function given λoptfoll of each type while keeping the size above ϵ. The whole
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procedure can be viewed as a series of Stackelberg games [24].
It is also assumed that after a group enters, the groups that die out will be removed from
the market. So a new group can retake the same strictness as a previous group that has been
eliminated before. We remark here that the current group will not come to the marketplace
if no λ values can satisfy the minimum population condition. In addition, a Type C group
will also not enter if existence of this group will lower the average payoff of individuals
within the society, that is, if its maximum utility is negative, as this is against the goal of a
Type C group.
We discretize the domain of λ into meshes and only allow groups to choose the λ
values on the grid points denoted by the points Λ. We refer to the set of strictnesses of
all the previous groups that have not died out by Λactive. The minimum possible strictness
λmin of any affiliation is automatically given by the mesh. The algorithm for adding one
group is presented in Algorithm 5.
5.1 Stationary Model with Switching Penalty
We first simulate this procedure using the “stationary multigroup model”. We do not take
birth, death, or inheritance into account. Further, we allow everybody to switch groups infi-
nite times, but individuals will only switch to a group with a utility higher than their current
group. Specifically we also introduce a penalty p in group switching. People will switch
to a new group only if they can gain p more there. This is done to prevent undercutting
and overcutting to some extent. Otherwise, a new group of the same type as a pre-existing
group could under or over cut them and gain all of their members, without really offering
anything new to those individuals. This penalty term also causes this stationary model to
exhibit some history dependence, as the order in which group arise will affect where in-
dividuals end up; this would not happen in a penalty-free model if infinite switching were
allowed. The cutoff r value for members of a preexisting group to switch to a new group is
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Algorithm 5.1 Algorithm of adding one group in the simulation of sequential Stackelberg
games.
for λcurr in Λ− Λactive do
if The population of current group is below ϵ then
continue
end if
for Group type of following group in set of group types do
for λfoll in Λ− Λactive − {λcurr} do
Evaluate the goal of following group Ufoll. Goal is −∞ if population is below ϵ.
end for
Obtain λoptfoll and U
opt
foll in the for loop.
if λoptfoll exists then
Evaluate the goal of the current group Ucurr,type given λ
opt
foll. Goal is −∞ if pop-
ulation is below ϵ.
else
Evaluate the goal of the current group Ucurr,type without λ
opt
foll. Goal is −∞ if
population is below ϵ.
end if
end for
Ucurr ← the average of all the Ucurr,type’s
end for
Obtain λoptcurr and U
opt
curr in the for loop. λ
opt
curr does not exist if no groups can be added.
if λoptcurr exists then
Λactive ← Λactive ∪ {λoptcurr}
end if










We note that if λpreexisting is fixed, r does not decrease monotonically as λnew grows in
some neighborhood of λpreexisting, unlike the penalty-free switching. This means that in
some extreme cases a group can choose its strictness between 2 other preexisting groups
and eliminate one of them as shown in the example below.
Suppose 4 groups with strictnesses λ1 = 0.04, λ2 = 0.033, λ3 = 0.004, λ4 = 0.021
are sequentially added, with penalty p = 0.01. The r ranges of people in each group after
a group is added are listed in Table 5.1. Note that, after the joining of the fourth the group,
the second group dies out. The second group will survive in this scenario if there is no
penalty in switching.
Table 5.1: An example of the stationary model with switching penalty where a group joins
between two other groups and eliminates one of them. The intervals in the cells indicate
the range of r values in each group.
With switching penalty First Group Second Group Third Group Fourth Group
After the Third Group Joins (0.5, 4.05) (4.05, 4.43) (4.43, 13.31)
After the Fourth Group Joins (0.5, 3.43) ∅ (4.43, 13.31) (3.43, 4.43)
Without switching penalty First Group Second Group Third Group Fourth Group
After the Third Group Joins (0.5, 2.62) (2.62, 4.08) (4.08, 15.81)
After the Fourth Group Joins (0.5, 2.62) (2.62, 3.06) (4.80, 15.81) (3.06, 4.80)
The following r distribution is used in the simulation: r − 1/2 ∼ Lognormal(µ, σ2)
with µ = −0.5 and σ = 2. The population threshold is ϵ = 0.01 and the penalty term is
p = 0.01. The λ domain is discretized evenly into 1000 parts such that all the feasible λ’s
are a positive multiple of 1/1000.
We first assume that all the groups that will join the marketplace are of the same type.
In this simulation, when a groups thinks one more step ahead, it only needs to consider a
group that has the same type as itself. The simulation terminates if no group can be added.
Fig.5.1 shows the strictnesses of the group added at each step and their final sizes for all
the three types.
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Seventy-six Type A groups can coexist under this distribution. The first Type A group
being added has strictness λ = 1. When the first type A group is added, it takes around
0.458 of the population leaving 0.542 to the unaffiliated one. All the following groups have
to locate themselves between two existing groups and tend to be as close to the stricter one
as possible. We observe that the strictnesses of following groups decreases monotonically
until no more groups can be added. The sizes of some groups still drop below the threshold
ϵ. That is because when a group joins the market, it does not consider that there is a
second group coming after the following group. However when the following group is
being added, it does consider the second group. So in order to survive, the λ value that the
following group chooses might be a little bit smaller than what the current group thinks.
As the r cutoff of the current group with λcurr and a following group with λfoll does not
depend monotonically on λfoll when a switching penalty exists, an even smaller λfoll might
harm the size of the current group instead of helping it. For example, the second group has
strictness 0.978 and thinks the third group will play 0.957. But the third group instead
chooses 0.956, making the population of the second group drop from 0.011 to 0.002.
Unlike Type A groups, only nine Type B groups can be added to the marketplace.
The strictness of the first Type B group is λ = 0.311. The Type B groups that join later
just select a strictness level in between other preexisting groups attempting to maintain a
minimum population while maximizing their size. All the groups can end up with a size
larger than ϵ. The average strictness of all the Type B groups is 0.2826.
Eight Type C groups coexist in the end. The strictness of the first Type C group is
λ = 0.552, larger than that of first Type B group. That is because by choosing such a
strictness, it might not gain a population as large as the Type B group, but it will benefit
more on the payoffs of its members and increase the overall average payoff. We also
observe that the first Type C group even has a larger population in the end than the first of
the Type B groups. Because purely aiming at a high size does not necessarily give the best
increase in the overall average payoff, Type C groups do not compete for population size
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as much as Type B groups, which gives opportunities for the first Type C group to preserve
a relatively large size. All the Type C groups that have entered the marketplace have an
average strictness at 0.2445.
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Figure 5.1: Simulation of the sequential Stackelberg game on the stationary model with
switching penalty. The left column shows the strictnesses of groups added at each step and
the right column presents the population of each group in the end of the simulation. (Top)
Type A groups only; (Middle) Type B groups only; (Bottom) Type C groups only.
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We also run the simulation with all three group types available. The procedure will end
if 10 affiliations have been added. We iterate over all possible combinations of group types
and present the statistics of group strictnesses in Table 5.2 and Fig. 5.2. We notice that as
expected, the Type A groups are much stricter than the other two types. Type C groups are
slightly stricter than Type B groups.
Table 5.2: Statistics of simulation of the sequential Stackelberg game on the stationary
model with switching penalty. Groups have an equal chance to be any of the three types.
Strictnesses Type A Groups Type B Groups Type C Groups
Maximum 1 0.754 0.778
75-percentile 1 0.311 0.297
50-percentile 0.76 0.07 0.069
25-percentile 0.34 0.007 0.017
Minimum 0.001 0.001 0.001
Average 0.6504 0.1721 0.1747



















Figure 5.2: Boxplot of simulation of the sequential Stackelberg game on the stationary
model with switching penalty. Groups have an equal chance to be any of the three types.
5.2 Dynamic Model
The procedure of adding groups is also simulated on the dynamic model described in Chap-
ter 3. When a new group is founded, it initially has an entirely new set of individuals ac-
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cording to the population-wide r distribution R with size ϵ/(1 − ϵ). We then renormalize
the whole population to 1. After renormalization, the new group has a population which is
equal to the minimum population threshold ϵ and the sizes of all the preexisting groups are
multiplied by (1−ϵ) while the r distribution in each group remains intact. The equilibrated
population after the entering of a new group can be obtained by solving the ODE (3.3) with
the initial condition mentioned above. In numerical simulations, we set ngσ in the ODE
to zero if the value drops below some small threshold and a group g is considered to be
eliminated if
∑
σ ngσ = 0. Moreover, to avoid people switching to a group with similar




where △λ = |λg − λg′| is the difference of the strictness levels
of those two groups. When △λ is very small, the probability of switching is also close
to zero; when △λ is larger than around 0.02, the factor is almost 1, so the probability of
switching is nearly the same as the original one. By doing so, undercutting and overcutting
are prevented to some extent, but not completely. That is because by choosing a similar
strictness level to a preexisting group, even if the new group can steal negligible population
from the preexisting group, it can still beat that preexisting group in the group rankings of
people in some other groups and attract those people.
The same R(r) and population threshold as the previous section are used, namely r −
1/2 ∼ Lognormal(µ, σ2) with µ = −0.5 and σ = 2 and ϵ = 0.01. In the ordinary
differential equation, the parameters are s = 3 and z = 0.5 . The λ domain is discretized
evenly into 500 parts such that all the feasible λ’s are a positive multiple of 1/500.
The first simulation is done under the assumption that all the groups that will enter the
market are of the same type. Due to the intensive nature of this computation, the program
was run on a compute cluster in parallel. The results are presented in Fig. 5.3. In all
simulations the strictest group has λ no more than 0.6. If a group chooses an even higher
strictness, it will easily be eliminated by the following group. The first Type A group has
strictness 0.564. At each step, there is always only one group other than the unaffiliated
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one that has population larger than 0.1 and the strictness level of that group is decreasing
along the simulation. We also notice that the affiliation with the largest size is the least
strict among all the affiliations. The first Type B group has strictness 0.468. After 100
steps, around nine groups including the unaffiliated one can coexist with size larger than
0.01. The strictness levels of the eight affiliations are spaced at a distance around 0.08. The
simulation of Type C groups has a quite different behavior from the other two. It terminates
at 10 steps. No more groups can enter the market because they will either fail to maintain
a minimum population size or will decrease the average payoff of individuals within the
society by eliminating some preexisting groups and causing those members to leave their
ideal group .
Similar to the previous section, we also run the simulation with the assumption that the
groups have an equal chance to be any of the three types and a random type of group will
join the market at each round. We end the procedure if 7 affiliations have been added and
search over all possible combinations of group types. The results are shown in Table 5.3
and Fig. 5.4. Only groups with population above the threshold ϵ = 0.01 are taken into
account. We observe that there are clear distinctions among the strictnesses of these three
types of groups. Type A groups have an average strictness 0.5722 with over 75% of them
being no more than 0.03 below or above the average. Type B groups are generally less strict
than Type A groups. The average strictness of Type B groups is 0.3436. Type C groups
have an average strictness 0.1322, which are the least strict. The strictnesses of 75% of the
Type C groups are no more than 0.220. By choosing low strictnesses, Type C groups can
raise the chance of people who prefer it to join it in the dynamic model. The overall payoff
of the whole population will grow if more people can stay in their favorite groups. It is also
notable that among the 37 possible combinations, on average 5.27 groups can have final
population above ϵ.
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Figure 5.3: Simulation of the sequential Stackelberg game on the dynamic model with
modified α. The left ones show the strictness levels of groups with size larger than 0.1 at
each step while the right ones present the strictness levels of groups with size larger than
the population threshold 0.01 at each step. (Top) Type A groups only; (Middle) Type B
groups only; (Bottom) Type C groups only.
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Table 5.3: Statistics of simulation of the sequential Stackelberg game on the dynamic model
with modified α. Groups have an equal chance to be any of the three types.
Strictnesses Type A Groups Type B Groups Type C Groups
Maximum 0.608 0.562 0.590
75-percentile 0.594 0.480 0.220
50-percentile 0.584 0.394 0.056
25-percentile 0.558 0.164 0.028
Minimum 0.288 0.026 0.014
Average 0.5722 0.3436 0.1322















Figure 5.4: Boxplot of simulation of the sequential Stackelberg game on the dynamic model




In this dissertation, we have constructed a dynamic model for the sizes of religious groups,
based on a unidimensional categorization of groups by their strictness level λ, interpreted
as the amount of time they expect their members to spend within the group contributing to
the common good. This model is similar to previous such models in the way it accounts for
how the strictness of a group interacts with the preferences of the members of the overall
population, who are effectively described by some distribution over strictness preferences
based on the individual’s utility function for out of group activities. Based on an indi-
vidual’s rate of utility for these out group activities r, all existing religious groups can be
ranked from highest to lowest utility, based on the group strictness levels. But, our model
adds to the existing literature by including a probabilistic component to group switching,
such that an individual may not necessarily be able to switch into her most preferred group
as in the stationary model and have to settle for one of lesser utility. Crucially, the prob-
ability of an individual being able to join a group is directly related to the probability of
having encountered members of that group during time when both the individual and the
group members were engaged in out of group time. Hence, it is more probable to join
larger groups, as one is more likely to have encountered its members by sheer number, and
to join lower strictness groups, as those individuals spend more time out of group during
which you might encounter them. At the same time, members of high strictness groups
may find it difficult to switch to another group, as they will have spent little time out of
group themselves. All of these effects, including possible inheritance from parents to off-
spring of religious preferences and possibly varying birthrates of the various groups, are
summarized by a system of ordinary differential equations for the various population sizes
in time.
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Analysis of the dynamic model has confirmed several phenomenon seem in prior mod-
els. For example, we have shown that when the only options are a single group with some
finite strictness and another “group” with zero strictness (capturing the ability of people to
be unaffiliated with any group), the size of the affiliated group decreases with strictness,
such that the group may not be able to survive at equilibrium if their strictness is too high.
This effect is not merely due to a reduced fraction of the population that would thrive with
such high strictnesses, and is intimately tied to the decreased probability of individuals join-
ing such a high strictness group. High rates of inheritance can mitigate this effect, as can
group switching probabilities that require fewer encounters with members before one can
readily join a group. Importantly, we have shown that a group of any strictness can survive
if the birthrate of its members is high enough in relation to the birthrate of non-members.
We also briefly examined from a numerical viewpoint a scenario with several (8) groups.
Our results highlight the inherent complexity of the system, given that the eventual equi-
librium varies significantly with parameters, and general trends are somewhat difficult to
discern. Further exploration of a setting with several groups will be of interest to social
scientists trying to understand the rich dynamics of religious markets, including the forces
that drive some groups to thrive and others to die out. This work may also be of interest
to a more general mathematical audience, who might find in it a rich source of interesting
mathematical problems.
Going beyond the multi-group model, we studied how groups might arrange themselves
with regard to strictness to optimize the goals of the group, be they simply maximizing the
contribution of their members (Type A), gaining the largest size (Type B), or maximizing
the average utility of the whole population in the society (Type C). Pure Nash equilibria
are not guaranteed to exist in the simultaneous-move games between two different types of
groups. Analysis of the games has shown that Type A group has a high strictness; Type B
group often tends to undercut or overcut the other group in the stationary model; Type C
group wants to distinguish itself from other groups.
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Finally, we analyzed the effects of new groups of these three types entering the religious
market. This procedure can be viewed as a sequence of Stackelberg games. Simulations
show how the three types of religious groups differentiate themselves with regard to strict-
ness. In the stationary model with switching penalty, Type A groups have the highest
strictness levels while Type B groups and Type C groups have roughly the same strictness
level. In the dynamic model, Type A groups are the strictest; Type B groups are moderate;





PROOFS OF THEOREMS 4.1 AND 4.2
Before proving the theorems, we present some basic concepts in game theory as well as
some definitions and results introduced by Reny et. al. [25] and Allison et. al. [26].
We denote an N -player game by G = (Xi, ui)Ni=1 where Xi is the strategy space and
ui : X → R where X = ×iXi is the payoff function of of player i. The subscript−i means
all the other players except i. If each Xi is a pure strategy space, we can extend each ui




ui(x)dµ. The mixed extension of G is denoted by Ḡ = (Mi, ui)Ni=1.
Definition A.1. If Xi is a nonempty compact subset of a topological vector space and ui is
bounded for every i, then the game G is called a compact game. If Xi is further a Hausdorff
set, then the game G is a compact Hausdorff game.
Definition A.2. Player i can secure a payoff of α ∈ R at x ∈ X if there exists x̄i ∈ Xi, such
that ui(x̄i, x′−i) > α for all x
′
−i in some open neighborhood of x−i. A game G is better-
reply secure if whenever (x∗, u∗) is in the closure of the set {(x, u) ∈ X × RN |u = u(x)}
and x∗ is not an equilibrium, some player i can secure a payoff strictly above u∗ at x∗. A
game G is payoff secure if for every x ∈ X and every ϵ > 0, each player i can secure a
payoff of u(x)− ϵ at x.
Definition A.3. A game G satisfies disjoint payoff matching if for all xi ∈ Xi , there exists
a sequence of deviations {xki } ⊂ Xi such that the following holds:
1. lim infk ui(xki , x−i) ≥ ui(xi, x−i) for all x−i ∈ Xi;
2. lim supk Di(x
k
i ) = ∅where Di(xi) = {x−i ∈ Xi : ui is discontinuous in x−i at (xi, x−i)}
is the set of discontinuities of player i.
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Definition A.4. A game G is reciprocally upper semi-continuous if whenever (x, u) is in
the closure of the set {(x, u) ∈ X × RN |u = u(x)} and ui(x) ≤ ui for every i, then
ui(x) = ui for every i.
Proposition A.1. Suppose that G is a compact game and G satisfies disjoint payoff match-
ing, then G is payoff secure.
Proposition A.2. If G is reciprocally upper semi-continuous and payoff secure, then it is
better-reply secure.
Proposition A.3. Suppose that G is a compact, Hausdorff game, then G possesses a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium if its mixed extension Ḡ is better-reply secure.
With all the definitions and propositions above, we now present the proofs of Theorems
4.1 and 4.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. As the strategy space [0, 1]×[0, 1] is a compact Hausdorff set and the
utilities UB and UC are bounded, the game G is a compact and Hausdorff game. Denoting
the set of probability measures on the Borel subsets of [0, 1]× [0, 1] by M , then the mixed
strategy µ can be defined as Ug(µ) =
∫
[0,1]×[0,1] Uidµ where g ∈ {B,C}. The mixed
extension of the game is referred as Ḡ = (M, (UB, UC)), which is also compact.
UC(λB, λC) is continuous on [0, 1]× [0, 1]. On the other hand, UB(λB, λC) has discon-
tinuity at λB = λC but UB(λB, λB) = max(UB(λ−B, λB), UB(λ
+
B, λB)), thus UB is upper
semi-continuous in (λB, λC) on [0, 1]×[0, 1], so it is with sum UB+UC . Therefore UB+UC
is also upper semi-continuous in µ on M . So the mixed extension Ḡ is reciprocally upper
semi-continuous.
Since UC is continuous, to check whether G satisfies disjoint payoff matching, we only
need to study the utility of the Type B group. The set of discontinuities of Type B group
DB(λB) is
D(λB) = {λC ∈ [0, 1] : UB(λB, λC) is discontinuous in λC at (λB, λC)},
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so D(λB) = {λB}. For a given λB, without loss of generality, we assume that UB(λB, λB) =
UB(λ
−
B, λB) (We will have a similar proof otherwise). Then clearly λB ̸= 0 and we can
find an strictly increasing sequence λk ↑ λB. So
lim inf
k




DB(λk) = lim sup
k
{λk} = ∅,
since all the λk’s are distinct. So the game G satisfies disjoint payoff matching. Hence its
mixed extension Ḡ is payoff secure.
Reciprocal upper semi-continuity and payoff security of Ḡ ensure that Ḡ is better-reply
secure by A.2. Therefore according to A.3, the original game G has a mixed Nash equilib-
rium.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. It is sufficient to prove that
UB(λmin, λmin) = UB(λ
+
min, λmin),
then UB is upper semi-continuous on [λmin, 1]× [λmin, 1]. We can use the same method as



















Thus the former function is increasing while the latter one is decreasing. Moreover, UB(0−, 0) =
0 < UB(0




∗ , λ∗) = UB(λ
+
∗ , λ∗).
Hence for λmin < λ∗, we have UB(λ−min, λmin) < UB(λ
+
min, λmin), then




min, λmin)) = UB(λ
+
min, λmin)
which completes the proof.
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